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on which the court could have relied in validating the pension adjustment. The
court did rely, however, on an implied reserve power which was obviously a child of
necessity. However, several more substantial rationales might have been employed.
For instance, it is well established that legislatures can change the salaries of public
employees. State v. Board of Trustees, 121 Wis. 44, 98 N.W. 954 (x9o4); Taylor v.
Beckham, 178 U.S. 548 (1899). See also 2 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 403 (1934). Therefore
it might not be unreasonable to assume that the parties understood that the legislature
intended that pension payments might also be altered. Such an understanding would
make legislative control in implied term in the pension arrangement. Another suggestion, that pensions are deferred wages, would also reach the same result on the basis of
the salary change rule. See 12 Encyc. Soc. Sci. 65 (1934). Cf. Casserly v. City of
Oakland, 56 P. (2d) 237, 238 (Cal. 1936). A third approach would be to invoke the
doctrine preventing a state from contracting away powers affecting public health,
safety or morals. See Denver & Rio Grande R.R. v. Denver, 250 U.S. 241 (1919);
New Orleans Public Ser., Iw. v. New Orleans, 281 U.S. 682 (1930). See also Merrill,
Application of the Obligation of Contract Clause to State Promises, 8o U. of Pa. L.
Rev. 639 (1932). This doctrine might well have been extended to invalidate long
term contracts which would otherwise prevent a reasonable exercise of the police
power. In the instant case, therefore, the court could more cogently have argued that
the pension system promotes efficient public service the control of which is squarely
within the police power, that frequently the maintenance of a pension system depends
on its financial adjustment, and that therefore the state must retain the power to
adjust pension payments.
However, whatever the rationale used to justify the change, the acceptance of the
contract theory points to judicial review of the reasonableness of the adjustments
rather than absolute legislative control in regard to changes in pension arrangements.
Corporate Reorganization-Allowance of Fees-Finality of State Court Decree
in Subsequent § 77B Proceedings-[Federal].--In a state foreclosure proceeding a final
decree of foreclosure was entered, providing, inter alia, that certain fees to the trustee
and his counsel for "services rendered and to be rendered" should be allowed as prior
liens upon the premises. A year later, the property not yet having been sold under the
foreclosure decree, a petition for reorganization under § 77B of the Bankruptcy Act
was filed. 48 Stat. giI (I934); ii U.S.C.A. 207 (r936). The trustee and his counsel,
the appellants in this proceeding, claimed the full amount given them by the state
court decree. After the plan had been accepted by the requisite number of creditors
(not including the appellants), the district court reduced the appellants' claims. On
appeal, held, reversed. The district court was not at liberty to consider the reasonableness of the fees fixed by the state court. It had power to reduce only those fees allowed
for "services to be rendered." It re De Luxe Apartment Hotel Bldg., 86 F. (2d) 772
(C.C.A. 7 th 1936).
Full recognition of allowances made in prior proceedings will necessitate either an
increase in the percentage of reorganized properties to be allocated for fees or a disproportionate reduction in fees allowed claimants for services performed in § 77B
proceedings. Either result is unfortunate. Section 77B (i) authorizes the judge in
reorganization to "make such orders as he may deem equitable ....for the payment
of such reasonable administrative expenses and allowances in the prior proceeding as
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may be fixed by the court appointing said receiver or prior trustee." 48 Stat. 920
(I934); i U.S.C.A. § 207 (i) (1936). Thus the extent of the reorganization court's
power to reduce such allowances depends upon judicial interpretation of this section.
Where fees have not been allowed in the prior proceeding until after the petition for
reorganization has been filed, lower federal courts have generally reduced fees, adding,
however, that the prior allowance should be used as a guide in determining what is a
reasonable fee. In re New York Investors, Inc., 79 F. (2d) 182 (C.C.A. 2d 1935); It re
Allied Owners Corp., 79 F. (2d) 187 (C.C.A. 2d 1935). See In re 211 E.DelawarePlace
Bldg. Corp., 7 F. Supp. 892, 896 (Ill.
1934) (reorganization court refused to make
allowances for services in prior proceedings until state court fixed fees); In re Davison
Chem. Co., I4 F. Supp. 821, 840 (Md. 1936); Hume v. Meyers, 242 Fed. 827 (C.C.A.
4 th 1917) (ordinary bankruptcy proceedings); 90 A.L.R. 1217 (1934); cf. Louisville
Trust Co. v. Comingor, 184 U.S. I8 (1902); Galbraithv. Vallely, 256 U.S. 46 (1921). At
the other extreme, where fees actually have been paid before the petition for reorganization is filed, the reorganization court is probably unable to compel the recipient to
disgorge on the ground that the fee was unreasonable. In re 7ooo South Shore Drive
Bldg. Corp., 86 F. (2d) 499 (C.C.A. 7 th 1936). Within these limits, however, there
exists little authority and less consideration of the control of reorganization courts over
allowances made in prior proceedings. See In re Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 13 F. Supp.
724 (Md. 1935); 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1111, 1205 (1936).
The above-quoted language of § 77B (i) apparently puts no limitations on the power
of a reorganization court to reduce prior allowances. The Supreme Court, however, in
defining "equity receivership" for the purpose of determining jurisdiction within § 77B
(a), has indicated that the words "receiver" and "trustee" in subsection (i) do not
include foreclosure receivers or trustees. Duparquet, Huot & Moneuse Co. v. Evans,
297 U.S. 216 (1936); cf. Chandler Bill, H.R. 6439, 75th Cong., 1st session, p. 47 (1937).
If this limited construction of subsection (i) were adopted, control over fees of these
officers in foreclosure proceedings could only be obtained by a liberal construction of
"representatives of creditors" in § 77B (c) (9), the subsection providing for fees in
reorganization proceedings generally. But since in the principal case the fees in question were allowed in a foreclosure receivership, the court in countenancing a reduction
of fees allowed for future services disregarded this dictum of the Duparquet case.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court itself seems to consider the Duparquet case inapplicable in determining the scope of subsection (i). Shulnan v. Wilson-SheridanHotel
Co., U.S. Sup. Ct. (April 26, 1937); see also, In re x88 West Randolph Bldg. Corp.,
C.C.H. Bankr. Serv. § 4405 (C.C.A. 7 th 1937). A more recent and more important
limitation on the reorganization court's power to reduce fees was introduced by the
Supreme Court in the Wilson-Sheridan case. Although the Court there held that the
prior allowance was not a final order because it did not include a "direction to pay,"
it indicated that where the order allowing fees in the prior proceeding did include a
"direction to pay," this allowance would not be reducible by the reorganization court.
The Court has thus introduced not only a standard of uncertain definition but also one
of which the lower federal courts have taken no account in considering their power to
reduce prior allowances. See In re Consolidation Coal Co., 14 F. Supp. 845 (Md. 1936);
In re Assoc. Telephone Utilities Co., C.C.H. Bankr. Serv. § 3926 (N.Y. 1936); In re
Davison Chem. Co., 14 F. Supp. 821 (Md. 1936). In the principal case, to sustain the
conclusion of the court that a reorganization court has no power to reduce fees set
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before the filing of the petition, the state court's order making the claims for fees "a
prior lien upon the premises" must be considered equivalent to a "direction to pay."
"Direction to pay" is a sensible concept only if it is limited to those cases in which the
court in the prior proceeding intended its order to be executed before reorganization
might ensue. Making a claim for fees a "lien upon the premises" can hardly be said
to indicate an intention that the claim be paid in the immediate future. Thus if the
"direction to pay" concept is to be retained, it should be limited to orders in which
fees are to be paid out of cash on hand or the proceeds of a sale to be held at the same
time. In approving the reduction of fees for "services to be rendered," the court in the
principal case not only suggested a possible limitation on the "direction to pay" concept, but also indicated a possible loophole through which reorganization courts may
find power to reduce prior allowances. As shown above, the court's order must be
considered as a "direction to pay" to sustain its decision as to services already rendered. But to sustain the reduction of fees for "services to be rendered,' it is necessary
to hold that an allowance for future services cannot be a final order even if couched
in terms constituting a "direction to pay." Furthermore, unless allowances in prior
proceedings are clearly labeled as being for past services, reorganization courts may
consider them as being for future services and therefore reducible.
Corporate Reorganization-Consideration of Plan in Conjunction with Foreclosure
Sale-Statutory Redemption-[Illinois].-In a foreclosure proceeding brought by the
trustee under a trust deed, a committee representing the majority bondholders bid in
at the sale, and in addition bought the statutory redemption right of the mortgagor.
The minority bondholders objected to the approval of the sale on the grounds that the
price was too low and that the court had no jurisdiction to consider the reorganization
plan submitted by the majority committee. On a certificate of importance to the
supreme court, held, (i)The court has jurisdiction to consider the reorganization plan
in order to avoid injustice to the parties concerned. The price was not too low when
considered in conjunction with the plan, which was fair. (2) The sale of the redemption
was valid, and by execution under the deficiency decree the trustee can recover the
money paid to the stockholders of the mortgagor. First Nat'l Bk. of Chi. v. Bryn
Mawr Beach Bldg. Corp., 6 N.E. (2d) 654 (Ill. 1937).
In resolving a doubt which had culminated in two conflicting Illinois appellate decisions, this case approves a technique already established in the federal and many state
courts by which injustice to majority as well as minority bondholders may be avoided.
If the court will not scrutinize the plan, fairness to the minority compels the court
to require a bid that will give the dissenter the full value of his interest, i.e., a bid approximating the full going-concern value of the property. But if such a bid is required
the premium on being a dissenter will be so great that it will be difficult to secure sufficient assenters to make reorganization financially possible. This dilemma of unfairness to the dissenter on the one hand, or the stagnation of property caused by the
thwarting of reorganization on the other, can be resolved only if the court considers
the fairness of the plan and bargains for as high a price as is consonant with the effectuation of the reorganization. For a fuller discussion of this problem see Katz, Protection of Minority Bondholders in Foreclosures and Receiverships, 3 Univ. Chi. L.
Rev. 517 (1936) and especially pp. 524-32; see also, i Gerdes, Corporate Reorganization § 16 (x936).

